

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

October 8, 1973

Dear Mr. Foreign Minister:

Attached is the message sent this morning to Mr. Hafiz Ismail, which I told you I would forward to you.


I would like also to take this opportunity to express how much I appreciate my contacts with you over these past days. I value the relationship which has developed and look forward to our continued association.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

Attachment

His Excellency
Muhammad Hasan al-Zayyat
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Suite 37-F
Waldorf Towers
New York, New York



ozt: 8, 1973


Message for Mr. Hafiz Ismail from Dr. Kissinger

I very much appreciate your taking the time amidst your present heavy preoccupations to share with me your thinking concerning developments in the Middle East.

Even before the outbreak of the current hostilities, I had told Foreign Minister Zayat that I was prepared to explore seriously and intensely with all parties, and especially with Egypt, what the United States might be able to do to assist the parties in bringing peace to the Middle East. This offer still stands.

Obviously, such an effort can best succeed in the calmest possible atmosphere. It is for this reason that the United States has attempted to bring about a ceasefire without at the same time taking a position which might produce a confrontation with the Egyptian side.


With respect to the specifics in your note of October 7, there are two questions. First, the U.S. side is not clear as to whether the first point in the position of the Egyptian side, that Israel has to withdraw from all occupied territories, must be implemented before a conference can take place or whether agreement in principle to such a condition is what is anticipated. Secondly, the U.S. side has received the following message from its Ambassador in Tehran:



-2-

"Prime Minister Hoveyda, at Shah's instruction, summoned me at 2315 local to read me cable to Shah from President Sadat transmitted via Iranian Ambassador to Cairo who saw Sadat early afternoon Egyptian time October 7. To summarize, cable gives optimistic description of Egyptian military position on East Bank of Suez Canal and of Egyptian prowess in crossing Canal and establishing bridgehead there. Then cable requests Shah to inform President Nixon that Egypt until now, in order to avoid fighting, has been ready to accept peace under certain conditions. However, Egypt has now been obliged to fight and to take casualties. It still wants peace, a lasting peace in the area. Sadat wants President Nixon to know that if Israel will evacuate all the territories occupied since June 5, 1967, Egypt will be ready to negotiate sincerely to place these territories under the control of the United Nations, or under the control of the four big powers, or under some other international control to be agreed. As for Sharm Ash Sheikh, Egypt is prepared to accept international supervision of freedom of navigation through Gulf of Agaba after Israeli withdrawal. Sadat wants Shah to explain foregoing to President Nixon so that casualties may be stopped as soon as possible."

The U.S. side would greatly appreciate clarification of the position on withdrawal and of the differences between the positions of the Egyptian side contained in your note and as passed to our Ambassador. In particular, did our Ambassador convey accurately the position of President Sadat



-3-

regarding evacuation of territories and the placing of them under international control?

I would like to reiterate that the United States will do everything possible to assist the contending parties to bring the fighting to a halt. The United States, and I personally, will also actively participate in assisting the parties to reach a just resolution of the problems which have for so long plagued the Middle East.

Warm personal regards.