

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy TEL AVIV  
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AmEmbassy MOSCOW  
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Feb 27 5 18 PM '65

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FOR GOVERNOR HARRIMAN FROM THE SECRETARY

I believe you can be very helpful to us in New Delhi by ascertaining in addition to other topics you will be discussing. Indian views on problem posed by Chicom nuclear weapons. Chicom will be exploding next nuclear device any day now and this likely cause new Indian worries over security from Chicom nuclear threat and excite new demands in India for abandonment current Indian peaceful uses policy. Shastri certainly knows this. He nevertheless told National Defense Council February 23 that GOI aware possible second Chicom test but after calm consideration GOI stands by determination not repeat not manufacture atom bomb.

As we see it Shastri and his supporters are exploring three things they need if they are to have good chance hold their own against pressures for an Indian bomb. One is an effective international nonproliferation agreement on which Indians, West and Soviets can agree. Adjournment of UNGA and uncertainty about convening of ENDC has temporarily deferred activity on this matter on which we hope India will be able exercise leadership.

Shastri

Drafted by: NEA:SOA:DTSchneider;dm:am:ns:2-27

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

NEA - Mr. Talbot

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Clearance:

(Revised in accordance with Secretary's instructions.)

ACDA - Mr. Fisher (informed)

DOD/ISA - Mr. [unclear] (informed)

S/S - Mr. Mills

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Shastri also badly needs to be able to demonstrate to his countrymen and Afro-Asians generally that India has achieved at least as much in fields science and technology as Chicoms and thus offset increase of prestige which coming to Chicoms as result their nuclear testing program. Ambassador Bowles, assisted by Jerry Wiesner and John Palfrey have looked into what we can do to help Indians in this area and we have just had follow-up talks here with Indian atomic scientist Homi Bhabha. We are repeating round-up telegram on Bhabha visit so you can see how we currently stand on this effort.

Third ~~(thing Shastri needs is some kind of security assurance against Chicoms nuclear attack. This is area in which I believe you and Ambassador Bowles can be most helpful during your visit to Delhi.)~~ Indians have <sup>some</sup> apparently done ~~much~~ thinking about assurances but still seem have no firm idea what would best meet their needs. <sup>They</sup> Their dilemma <sup>is</sup> [is probably] caused in part by realization that public acceptance any kind assurance from US alone would destroy much of basis for nonalignment and affect their relations with Soviets. <sup>Do they believe that</sup> If they could get parallel Soviet and US assurances <sup>which have they had</sup> [this] would probably meet problem but our best--but limited--information is that so far they have had little success with Soviets. OK

GOI has never directly raised question security assurances with us, nor has it to our knowledge reacted to President's statements of October 16 and 18, 1964. Shastri did, however, discuss assurance question with Harold Wilson and has publicly mentioned need for protection from nuclear powers several times. <sup>repeated</sup> Recurrent theme <sup>Shastri's</sup> his public statements has been that possession nuclear power gives nuclear states responsibility to assure security of nonnuclear states from threat of nuclear

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You might inquire of Shastri whether his talk with Harold Wilson indicated the possibility of any Commonwealth arrangement to strengthen India's position without

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aggression. ~~We do not want to take on full weight of this responsibility~~ ~~by specific commitments to individual countries.~~ Moreover, <sup>HP</sup> when we think in terms of assurances against Chicom nuclear aggression we must keep in mind other free nations around periphery of China. Therefore, we do not ~~now~~ want to go beyond scope of assurances of October 16 and 18, 1964. ~~What we want you to do is to apply these specifically to India.~~

We hope therefore you and Ambassador Bowles can get <sup>clear understanding of Shastri's stand on</sup> ~~into discussion~~ security assurances ~~with Shastri.~~ ~~Believe best way of approaching this would be by giving him advance notice of restatement of President's assurances of October 16 and 18. White House plans to make following next detonation. We are transmitting in Septel preliminary draft text which is under consideration.~~ In discussing assurances you and Ambassador Bowles may take following line:

1) We have noted Indian interest in some kind of security assurance from nuclear powers. In particular we have noted Ambassador B. K. Nehru's speech of February 4 in which he said QUOTE The need of India, as of other nonnuclear powers, is security against nuclear attack. This can be provided either by an independent deterrent or through the combined and collective security offered by all the present nuclear powers and we are waiting for an answer. UNQUOTE. ~~did not intend include Peiping in category of QUOTE present nuclear~~ ~~FYI. We suppose Nehru does not consider Peiping as present nuclear power, and that's OK.~~ ~~powers UNQUOTE which might offer collective security to India. END FYI.~~ We are aware that India has decided against developing its own nuclear weapons program, which we consider a commendable example worth of emulation around world.

(2) ~~President wanted Shastri to know in advance that after next detonation White House plans to issue statement reaffirming assurances of October 16 and 18, 1964.~~

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3) President <sup>(also wanted you to)</sup> direct Shastri's attention to <sup>President's</sup> fact, October 16 and 18 assurances <sup>which</sup> are applicable to <sup>(are)</sup> India, as to other free Asian nations which may be threatened by Chicom nuclear attack.

4) Specifically, India should know that possession of a nuclear weapons capability by Communist China will have no effect on readiness of US respond Indian requests for help in dealing with Chicom aggression. We will meet our defense commitments to India (see numbered paragraph 4 below). <sup>OK</sup> ~~Nations such as India that do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that if they need our strong support against some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it. Obviously we do not intend to stand by and watch India be threatened with nuclear destruction.~~

5) US support to India over the years against Communist China is well documented. President Eisenhower assured Prime Minister Nehru of our support when he visited New Delhi in 1959. Our response to India's request for help in 1962, with which you were closely associated, speaks for itself. As Prime Minister aware, following Nehru's request for US manned aircraft to help India meet Chicom attack, US carrier with attack aircraft was enroute to Bay of Bengal when fighting ended in November of 1962. Our Air Defense Agreement of July 1963, in which we agreed to consult with GOI in event of Chicom ~~attack~~ attack on India, is earnest of our intentions in future. So is agreement of November 1962 under which we currently are providing military assistance to India. Chicoms are aware of significance of these agreements as they are of meaning of assurances President has given since they detonated first nuclear device.

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6) US has capability of responding to Chicom nuclear attack on free Asia in wide variety of ways. Our nuclear power is deployed in Pacific and can reach all areas of Mainland China. Our nonnuclear power is also within easy reach of these areas. Communist China is aware of the capabilities of US power and of the serious consequences it would suffer if it committed nuclear aggression. We have every intention of maintaining our superiority in size and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal as long as there is threat to Free World interests.

7) We would welcome opportunity to acquaint GOI in more detail with US capability to respond to Chicom nuclear attack. Should Prime Minister so desire, we would be glad <sup>to give him 100% assurance of our</sup> ~~show~~ Indian Chiefs of Staff or their representatives ~~see~~ our defense facilities in Pacific ~~and continental US~~. FYI. Release of information on our nuclear capabilities must be made subject to review at highest levels. End FYI.

8) We wanted India have this private <sup>view of US attitude toward</sup> explanation of US support against threat of Chicom nuclear aggression. FYI. We do not plan at this time make any public statement of assurance specifically singling out India. End FYI. We want to be sure that Prime Minister realizes fully implication of President's assurances for Indian security.

During course of discussion we hope you and Ambassador Bowles can lead Shastri to such an understanding of our security assurances. We must, however, avoid, by showing too much concern, placing Indians in position to seek too high a price for their refraining from taking the nuclear route.

I know you will want to consult carefully with Ambassador Bowles before you make final plans for your talks with Shastri. Believe you will particularly want to

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want to get Ambassador Bowles' views on whether time is ripe for such specific talk on Indian nuclear security problem. Purpose of this message is to let you know what we are prepared to tell Indians if you and Ambassador judge climate is right to do so.

GP-3.

End

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