
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51	FBO	ICA	SIAI	SUBJECT Indian Capability and Likelihood to Produce Atomic Energy.
2				REF:
	COM		XMB	TO: BONN, CAIRO, COPENBAGEN, COLOMBO, KARACHI, LONDON, NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, PARIS, BOMBAY
5	ASI NSI V	ĵψ ,	3 Ago	Enclosed is a General Requirement prepared by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) outlining information needed on atomic energy developments in India. The requirement includes a background statement summarizing information on the subject available in Washington. The Department, which is represented on JAEIC, participated in the drafting of the requirement.
				The majority of the questions included in the requirement are technical in nature, in keeping with the authority and responsibilities of JAEIC. This should not, however, preclude reporting on any political and political economic considerations which would enter into a decision to (a) embark on an expanded nuclear program, including the scope and direction of such an expanded program, and (b) the relationship of such a program to the capability and probable intentions of India to produce nuclear weapons. This might include, for example, such factors as the relationship to the overall problem of existing or possible future treaties and/or agreements with other countries, the attitudes of political parties and leaders toward nuclear power and weapons programs, and the extent to which the cost of expanded nuclear development programs - plus other economic factors such as the required diversion of resources from non-military uses - would have a bearing upon decisions made in this field.
	300	V2. 		Posts should regard this as a continuing requirement to be reported upon as pertinent information becomes available. It should not be confused with NIE no. 4-3-61, "Muclear Weapons and Nuclear Delivery Capabilities of Nth Countries," which was the subject of CA-9529 of May 4, 1961. However, contribution to the NIE will of course cover some of the same subject matter dealt with in the JAEIC requirement. The background information furnished in the latter requirement indicates what is already known in Washington and therefore need not be reported.
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RA	FTEO	Ta	IR eTC	0:CGB:MPHallament 6/9/61 Contents and CLASSAPICATION APPROVED BY:
LE	ARAN		SOA	- Mr. Leatherman 2 RSB - Mr. Flow of the REU - Mr. Witt Color - Mr. Russel Brown S/SA - Dr. Kovach - Mr. Bream 16 S/SA - Dr. Kovach - Kr. Bream 16 S/SA - Dr. Kovach
-61	™ DS	-972	EUR	- Mr. Winslis - Mr. Stuart Pos MIE - Mr. To Testos And The Constant Post Page 1961 Page 1771





JCSM-900-66

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3883

Subject: The Indian Nuclear Problem: Proposed Course of Action (U)

1. Beference is made to a paper on the above subject, dated 13 October 1964, which was approved by the Thompson Committee on Nuclear Capability and forwarded by the Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), to members of the Committee of Principals for approval or comment. On 19 October 1964, the Thompson Committee reviewed the paper is the light of the intervening deronation of the Chinese nuclear device on 16 October 1964. The recommended course of action and a scurances to India were considered to be criti applicable, and it was directed that the paper be updated accordingly.

1. 26807/64 Acts Park Control of the applicable accordingly.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the alternative courses of action considered and concur that the action selected is proper at this time. In considering US assurances enumerated in subparagraph Sa on page 12 of the paper, the first, second, and fourth do not exceed those previously given India by President Tisenhower on 10 December 1959, and by Ambassador Bowles on 25 March 1964. These assurances were generally reaffirmed by the President's statement on 16 October 1964. The third assurance proposes that the United States issue, at an appropriate time after detonation of a Chinese auctear device, a unilateral public deciaration regarding its response to Chinese use of nuclear weepons against another Asian state. This assurance was given by the President to his speech on 13 October 1964. The President did not, however, limit this sesurance to nations of Acia. Over-all, the US assurances appear appropriate as a basis for discussions with India at which time Indian intentions can be more accurately determined. At the same time, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that it is most important that no actions be taken which could alienate US allies, especially Pakistan.

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- 3. The assurances proposed are general in nature and do not commit the United States to any specific military course of action. This will permit flexibility of response consistest with US interests and other strategic commitments. Existing US forces are structured to permit implementation of current contingency plans for assistance to India as required to stop a maximum supportable Chinese communist attack and to restore the status quo that existed prior to initiation of aggression. The adequacy of current US military resources will, of course, depend on the scope of assistance required and other concurrent strategic military requirements.
- 4. With respect to Soviet assurances, it is recommended that the United States not initiate discussions on this matter with either India or the Soviet Union. Any implication that the United States would encourage assurances from the Soviet Union could result in greater Soviet influence within the Indian Armed Forces. The United States is currently attempting to stem a trend in this direction.
- 5. Subject to the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of the Thompson Committee report,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

CURTIS E. LeMAY Acting Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff