

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Israel Reactor
S/RE FILE 6071
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COUNTRY	Israel	REPORT NO.	OO-B-3,174,835
SUBJECT	Nuclear Engineering Training/Large Nuclear and Electric Power Plant near Beersheba/ French Nuclear Assistance to Israel/Israeli Attitude Towards the Announcement of its Large-Scale Nuclear Effort/Opportunity for US Participation in Nuclear Powered Water Conversion	DATE DISTR.	9 February 1961
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PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Tel Aviv/Jerusalem Nov 60		

FILE

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: A US citizen who is a nuclear engineer. He has been associated for several years with a training reactor. He is highly qualified in his field.

He has traveled extensively, visiting various parts of the world in connection with the setting up of programs for nuclear engineering training and to consult with government officials in regard to the problems of nuclear education. On a recent trip he was invited to consult with officials in Israel on this subject.

1. When I went to Israel in November 1960 it was my first trip. I was to advise in connection with nuclear engineering training. I was aware that there was a training reactor in Israel, and, at the Weizmann Institute and at other places, nuclear engineers were being trained. I was completely unprepared for the magnitude of the effort in Israel, or for the attitude of some of the Israelis in regard to it. What I learned about the large classified project near Beersheba all came indirectly. I spoke with a number of highly placed Israelis who were forced to acknowledge the existence of the classified effort in order that any use might be made of my consultative capabilities, but no one spoke to me of it in detail or gave any direct information about it. For this reason I prefer to keep the names of the Israeli officials with whom I spoke, and who were placed in the position of having to acknowledge some of the characteristics of the classified project, to myself.
2. One of the first places I was taken to consult was the laboratory of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission. As soon as the conversation started it immediately became apparent that the Israelis had not anticipated that to discuss nuclear training with me they would have to reveal the objectives for which the training was being conducted. As a result, I had to ask pertinent questions, the responses to which immediately revealed the existence of very important project which the Israeli officials could not discuss with me. This impression was fortified with each of the conversations I had in Israel until it overshadowed everything else about my trip there. To name two items which immediately brought the classified project into evidence was the anomaly of the number of people being trained in nuclear engineering, the number desired to be trained in nuclear engineering, compared with the size of the present and planned unclassified atomic energy program. At the Weizmann Institute 20 or 30 people already have been graduated from a rather intensive course in nuclear engineering. Add to this the trainees at other Institutes and the reluctance to name exactly how many were expected to be trained in the near future, a

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